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Introduction
1 The  announcement  of  the  presidential  poll  results  caused  a  massive  outpouring  of
violence It led to the loss of several hundred human lives and forced a tens of thousands
others  to  flee  their  homes.  These  events  cast  light  on the  multiple  problems (social
controversy, political sclerosis, land inequalities and escalating crime in the society) that
Kenya faces as a State.
2 Is  Kenya a  country of  illusions  and shortcuts?  Praised just  a  short  while  ago for  its
political stability and economic growth, everything was disrupted in the last few days of
2007:  election  rigging,  police  repression,  hard-line  positions  by  cliques,  information
blackout,  bloody  settling  of  scores,  reactivation  of  ethnic  tensions,  political
assassinations, destruction of property, deaths by the hundreds… there is little missing
from the panoply of a continent in crisis. The daily life of Kenyans was disrupted. Political
conflict, social revolt and the crystallization of ethnic rivalries combined with growing
opportunistic crime in a worrying trend. A brief look at these events will be followed by
an attempt to understand the far-reaching failings in Kenya’s history and society which
some leading political players embraced, perhaps for the worst.
 
Outbursts: increased forms of violence
3 In Kenya there is a tradition of political violence, be it State-sponsored or private, which
climaxes during elections, especially since the inception of multiparty politics in 1991.
The use of ethnicity in political debate and in social relations, both as inward-looking
censure and a means of renegotiating social relations, brings about tensions at the height
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of these instances. The face-off over the presidency between a Kikuyu, outgoing President
Mwai Kibaki,  and a Luo, Raila Odinga, who hails from one of the country’s two main
ethnic communities,1 led to fears of excesses.
4 The election campaigns were verbally very virulent and shortly after the nominations for
parliamentary elections, human rights organizations in Kenya denounced the instances of
intimidation and murder.  The agitation served as some sort  of  pre-electoral  “ritual,”
which leads to its fair share of deaths during every election period. All the same, the
voters kept their votes, localising democratic deadline better than their political elite,
who yielded to their old habits.
5 On 30 December 2007, after three days of uncertainty, the Electoral Commission of Kenya
(ECK) Chairman, Samuel Kivuitu, announced Kibaki’s re-election amidst chaos.2 From the
unofficial figures regularly communicated by the media, many expected a win by Odinga,
who was leading by several hundred thousand votes after the second round of counting.
However, votes from Central Province and North Eastern Province, which were
favourable to Kibaki, were yet to be counted. Last-minute manipulations toppled over all
this.3 Soon after  the announcement  of  the results,  Nairobi  was  engulfed in violence,
especially the slums that heavily supported Odinga, along with several big towns in the
Rift  Valley  (Eldoret),  Nyanza  (Kisumu)  and Coast  Province  (Mombasa)4.  After  several
tempestuous  days,  during  which  the  violence  reached  its  peak  on  3 January  2008,
hundreds  of  deaths  and tens  of  thousands  of  displaced persons  were  reported.5 The
violence paralysed the country’s economy6 and revived ethnic tensions that had been
largely dormant.
6 There  seemed  to  be  evidence  of  election  rigging  by  the  government  using  various
mechanisms.7 To a lesser extent ODM also seemed to have participated in rigging. Popular
vindication built up as more and more signs of manipulation were denounced by ODM as
well as European Union and Commonwealth observers, followed by local NGOs and some
ECK commissioners.8
7 News and rumours about the rigging sparked off events.9 More than the ethnic affiliation
of the suspected frauds in the elections, it is the disgust over their political strategy that
fuelled the riots. Although the chaos started off as a political conflict (which could be
described as a “civil coup d’État”), it took the form of a social revolt in its initial days,.
Most of the rioters were jobless youth who believed Odinga was the only candidate who
hearkened to their plight—and they were not all Luo, as stressed by Anne Cussac in the
following chapter. The two epicentres of the demonstrations were Kisumu, in Nyanza
Province,  and the  Kibera  slums in  Nairobi,  both ODM strongholds.  However,  clashes
between the rioters and security forces were soon worsened by fighting between ethnic
gangs  (Kikuyu  against  Luo;  Kalenjin  against  Kikuyu…).  In  Nairobi,  Kibera,  Mathare,
Kawangware,  Korogocho, Dandora,  Huruma and Kariobangi slums were engulfed by a
wave of riots for several days. These attacks, which were initially ethnically motivated
gave  way  to  blind  destruction.  The  protests  became  criminal,  with  gangs  taking
advantage of the crisis to loot and rape.
8 From January 2008, violence rocked the Rift Valley in Kericho and Eldoret then Naivasha
and Nakuru. During inter-ethnic clashes, apart from the destruction of movable and fixed
property as well as murders, there was a distinct desire displayed to spread terror by
choosing soft targets (pregnant women, children and newly-born babies, the disabled).
The use of machetes, knives or iron bars, recourse to killings and rape, were some of the
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cruel  means of  reminding the “enemy” community that anything was possible.10 The
intervention  by  Mungiki  militia,  known for  its  extreme  violence,  undoubtedly  made
tempers flare. This could have encouraged a backlash of similar excesses by adversaries.11
9 The  violence  thus  manifested  itself  in  several  dynamics:  police  repression  of  ODM
supporters and gangs of looters, with a prevailing shoot-to-kill order;12 militia action on
political orders (Mungiki as well as Kalenjin, Luo and to a lesser extent Kisii  militia);
operations  of  ad  hoc  vigilante  groups  carefully  created  to  adhere  to  ethnic  criteria;
exactions by groups of thugs who sometimes passed for militia or vigilante groups; and
settling  of  personal  scores  between  groups  or  individuals  taking  advantage  of  the
situation to grab or destroy rival business, or to take revenge on a tenant or landlord.13
Therefore,  there  was  real  confusion,  including  in  the  western  parts  of  the  country,
Odinga’s bedrock of support, where old feuds resurfaced, for example in the Rift Valley
and the Mt Elgon area14. Violence was often between adolescents or young men for whom
it meant defying traditional norms while questioning the political ability of the older
generation in their respective communities. It is they who were responsible for erecting
roadblocks and harassing motorists on an unprecedented scale.
10 Although the  worst  violence  affected major  urban centres,  the  rural  areas  were  not
spared either.15 Parallel to the displacement of people witnessed in Eldoret, from Burnt
Forest to the Uganda border, in Narok there were increased incidents of cattle rustling. In
an area  where  this  usually  happens  after  the  dry  season,  starting  mid-March,  when
pastoralist  communities need to “restock,” these incidents occurred much earlier.  As
early as January and February, there were attacks in Lokwamosing, Samburu (Eastern
Province),  Lamuria,  Rumuruti  (Central  Province),  Cherangany,  Naivasha and Koibatek
(Rift Valley), which led to scores of deaths and theft of hundreds of heads of cattle.16
Whereas  a  delinquency of  opportunism can be seen in the cattle  rustling,  it  further
appears that they underwent a transformation at the end of February, developing into
deeper land and regional rivalries and showing that the communities involved (Samburu,
Pokot, Maasai, Kikuyu, among others) were pursuing medium-term strategies.
11 Political leaders traded accusations over the violence using strongly emotive terms like
“genocide”  and  “ethnic  cleansing”—undoubtedly  to  draw  the  attention  of  the
international  community  which  was  still  traumatized  by  its  failure  during  the  1994
Rwandan genocide.
 
Confusion, ethnicity, tribalism, regionalism
12 In many ways Kenya’s democratization process has been spectacular and rapid.  Even
though multiparty politics  did not  lead to an immediate political  transition,  political
expression has quickly gained ground. There has been tolerance and even encouragement
in some cases for public expression without the danger of harassment by security forces.
But this freedom is fragile as witnessed in the intimidation of human rights organization
leaders during the month of January 2008.
13 The 2002 elections brought political  transition along with Kibaki’s victory.17 With the
hopes that were raised, these elections masked a number of democratic shortcomings
such  as  unfulfilled  promises,  political  failures  and  corruption  scandals,  which
characterized  Kibaki’s  first  term  in  office.  Above  all,  the  government  proved  to  be
incapable (or had little will) to directly face the main problems in the country. Among
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these were equitable land distribution and unemployment among the youth. Indeed, the
violence in political  and social  relationships was a reminder of  the bad memories of
ethnicity, tribalism, land issues and Majimbo.18
14 Political debate in Kenya has been perpetually ethnicized since independence but as John
Lonsdale points out, the chaos is not that easy to explain with reference to old “tribal”
rivalries or cynical political calculations.19 A number of the current misunderstandings
come from ambiguous relationships between British settlers and the Kikuyu, who were
among  the  first  victims  and  beneficiaries  of  colonization.  In  the  1950s,  the  Kikuyu
rebellion movement, Mau Mau, and the numerous appropriations led to the Kikuyu being
viewed as guardians of anti-colonial nationalism, relegating the emancipation efforts by
ethnic communities to the background.20 Throughout Kenya’s history there is a “moral
ethnicity,” which first developed among the small communities in the 19th century then
took  root  among  the  larger  communities.  This  phenomenon is  a  system of  internal
regulation within each community built upon the notions of honour, patronage,
generation, gender, poverty, wealth, property.21
15 Thus, “when the elites in Kenya go too far, their mistakes are largely interpreted as an excess in
tribalism […] politics of agreed, which offend the imagined moral economics of ethnic patronage in
a relationship founded on production.”22 However, as soon as Jomo Kenyatta came to power at
independence, political actors resorted to exacerbated parochialism, instrumentalising
segments of administration (provincial, district, authority and police), misappropriating
public resources and diverting them to those close to them and to fund their election
campaigns, organized “clean-up” operations, and under Daniel arap Moi, they carried out
ethnic killings as well as financial mismanagement.
16 These practices, together with the government’s propensity to capitalise on ethnicity,
gave form to the imagined communities which crystallized and developed protection
reflexes during crises. Thus, during the worst chaos at the beginning of 2008, a number of
Kenyans withdrew into their ethnic cocoons, which they considered more reassuring—
forming ethnic defence groups and refusing to talk to “enemies.” What remains to be
seen  is  how  the  internal  tensions  are  negotiated  within  each  ethnic  community,
particularly among the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo. Another central aspect is that the anti-
Kikuyu sentiments were greatly aggravated. The Kikuyu were accused of manipulating
State apparatus, monopolizing the economy, controlling State firms and grabbing a lot of
land. There were many fantasies about the Kikuyu community, which also mirrored its
own fears of extermination if their representatives did not remain in power.
17 The January and February 2008 violence in the Rift Valley was largely a result of the old
political strategies. During the colonial period, the Nandi and the Kipsigis were forcefully
displaced to give way to White settlers. At independence, Kenyatta replaced the settlers
with  members  of  the  Kikuyu  community  whom  he  resettled  by  the  thousands.  He
appointed Moi, a Tugen, as Vice-President whose mission was to give positions to Nandi
leaders  on  condition  that  they  accepted  an  arrangement  unfavourable  to  their
community.  Those  opposed  to  the  arrangement  sometimes  paid  with  their  lives  in
political assassinations under the guise of accidents. When he ascended to power in 197823
,  Moi  sought  to  establish  a  new  ethno-territorial  order,  closely  associating  ethnic
community and administrative regions in order to create easily identifiable land and
electoral areas.24 In 1992, as the first multiparty elections approached, the government
organized  violence  aimed  at  displacing  the  Kikuyu.  This  was  officially  explained  as
restoring the land to its original owners but in reality, the government wanted to prevent
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Kikuyu voters from voting. Kikuyu resistance forced Moi to declare a state of emergency.
A few years later, in 1996 and 1997, in order to avoid a repeat of this experience with
mixed results, local leaders in northern Rift Valley helped many Kipsigis to settle on the
land without displacing the Kikuyu who were still there by hiving off land from forests
and government land. At the highest level of government, there was concern about re-
drawing  constituency  boundaries  to  conform  to  the  new  settlements.  These
manipulations provoked fresh tension, hundreds of deaths and the displacement of tens
of thousands others with the intervention of Kalenjin militia had already been causing
chaos alongside the police. Then in 2003, the Kibaki government expelled thousands of
Kalenjin farmers who had “illegally” settled in Molo District, the epicentre of conflicts for
over ten years. Inter-ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley also led to complex and sometimes
contradictory dynamics: poverty, the desire to legally own land, ethnic rivalries and the
reaction to government insensitivity to the immense disorder that it had contributed in
creating.
18 The land question is paramount in understanding Kenyan politics.  Despite significant
urbanization, over 70% of the population live in rural areas. Additionally, “the agrarian
economic policies and regional disparities significantly inform political rivalries, which inspire the
fight for control of means of making land productive, a fundamental attribute for any kind of social
upward mobility and an effective means of primitive accumulation in areas where land is most
fertile.”25 The high population growth rate worsens the competition for land, particularly
in the most attractive areas, with the highest rainfall (Central and Western Provinces).
19 The land issue has aggravated social, political and economic relations since the colonial
period.  In  2004,  the  Ndung’u  report highlighted  the  inequalities;  land  grabbing,
mismanagement and corruption in land allocation under the Kenyatta and Moi regimes,
implicating  former  ministers  of  parliamentarians,  judges,  officers  and  other  civil
servants.26 Land distribution is heavily politicised and the central government, like the
provincial  administration is  perpetually  changing its  principles—legal  mechanisms in
relation to land are now exceptionally complex with numerous favours accorded.27 The
Ndung’u report, whose findings included falsified documents, excessive payments and the
existence of fraudulent title deeds, emphasized the need for presidential intervention on
the matter, especially concerning the degazetting of inalienable urban land. It was not
surprising that most incidents of land manipulation occurred during the 1992, 1997 and
2002 electoral periods when land was used as political reward in a classical system of
patronage. This also gave rise to the most classic cases of corruption—to recover funds,
companies  and  administrations  exchanged  huge  tracts  of  land  without  valuation.
Similarly, protected areas were re-distributed with complete impunity.28
20 Public  attention  logically  focused  on  community  inequalities,  particularly  on  land
restructuring from which the Kikuyu benefited under Kenyatta and from which other
communities  benefited,  starting  with  the  Kalenjin  under  Moi.  Alliances  can  thus  be
observed in the shadow of ethnic rivalries, like the Forum for Restoration of Democracy
(Ford) which was formed at the beginning of the 1990s to protect the Kikuyu, Luo and
Luhya from political scheming by Moi, who ensured that only those who swore allegiance
to him remained in the Rift Valley. He accepted the introduction of multiparty politics
but, on the other hand, did everything to demonstrate that the system could only lead to
disorder.  In  this  regard,  the  rekindling  of  the  debate  on  Majimbo—the  regional
redistribution of power discussed by A. Cussac—could only fan the flames of the 2007
election campaigns.
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Disintegration: failing political strategies
21 After the 2002 elections, many betrayals and failures undermined the credibility of the
Kibaki regime. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which propelled him to power,
criticised his predecessor Moi of ethnicizing the State and impoverishing Kenyans, by
approving intra- and inter-ethnic violence and allowing insecurity to flourish. For the
opposition, the best response to the crisis was to form an interethnic structure. NARC
agreed to the sharing of posts between the six principal ethnic leaders, Kibaki (Kikuyu),
Odinga (Luo), Charity Ngilu (Kamba), George Saitoti (Maasai/Kikuyu), Kipruto arap Kirwa
(Kalenjin),  Kijana Wamalwa (Luhya)  and Musyoka (Kamba).  However,  very soon after
Kibaki’s victory, it became evident that the Kikuyu networks sought to consolidate the
power that had finally been recaptured. The inter-ethnic power-sharing agreement was
ignored  and  constitutional  reform  which  was  to  lead  to  the  creation  of  the  prime
minister’s post was repeatedly postponed. It was then left to a parliamentary committee
whose recommendations were not even heeded.29 NARC then fell apart, giving way to new
parties while others re-emerged. Thus, after a brief period of calm, the political game
resumed with a shared ideal: the protection of an ethnic community’s interests against its
“enemies”  by  returning  to  its  roots  and  through  common  destinies  and  social
responsibilities.
22 Created  in  2005  during  the  constitutional  referendum  campaigns,  the  ODM  brought
together politicians from various ethnic communities, who were disillusioned with NARC.
Musyoka created his own structure while Odinga, a Luo, was able to gather around him
Kalenjin,  Luhya,  Kamba,  Mbeere and Arab leaders.  Kibaki’s  secret  hope to see as the
creation of as many parties as the disillusioned politicians within NARC was thus dashed.
23 Beyond the reasoning of networks, Kenya as a State demonstrated an incapacity to define
alternative forms of conflict management and resolution and was helpless in responding
to crises. It showed its ineffectiveness in projecting a sense of national belonging strong
enough to overcome ethnic divisions which led to an identity crisis and some sort of
political schizophrenia. While the elite called for national identity in their rhetoric, they
in fact used their positions to maintain their ethnic base. A political participation crisis is
also  emerging;  the  proliferation  of  political  parties  does  not  help  in  enhancing
transparency and election rigging threatens to encourage voter apathy. Above all, beyond
the events mentioned, the institutional crisis takes on other worrying trends. First, due to
the opacity of the political system, the State’s social and economic diffusion is weak and
contributes to the freezing up of communities within their ethnic space. Furthermore,
the State’s “official” capacity to control instruments of violence has weakened. One may
ask to  what  extent  some sectors  of  the  Kenyan state  have fallen under  the  yoke of
militias, which have become increasingly more difficult to contain by political leaders.
24 Electoral manipulation and the weakness (or bad faith) of the State in channelling the
violence has indeed encouraged militias.  Groups like Mungiki  and Chinkororo (Kisii),
which had never been dismantled, and other more transient ones either reformed or
rehabilitated. Examples are Kamjesh, Talibans, Baghdad Boys (all Luo), as well as Kalenjin
militias supported by Kalenjin business people and political figures in the Rift Valley, the
People’s Liberation Army and the Group of 41 (the 41 other ethnic communities apart
from the Kikuyu),30 have for a long time edged out youth wings that had been activated by
political  parties  during  election  campaigns.31 Currently,  however,  some  groups  have
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grown larger than their creators.32 The Mungiki example is the most outstanding. Its
members were active at the beginning of the year in Central Province, the Rift Valley and
Nairobi, with a clear slogan: “the time for revenge is now.”33 They were also responsible for
the  chaos  in  Naivasha,  Nakuru,  Thika  and Ruiru  at  the  end of  January.  However,  it
appears that this group, secretly supported by leading Kikuyu political figures, is divided.
Those within Mungiki who were paid by politicians close to the president to cause chaos
are considered renegade by the others who are more concerned with central issues such
as  the  land  issue.  In  fact,  in  the  cat  and  mouse  game  with  the  government,  which
sometimes uses the group and at others,  represses it,  there is  no assurance that the
militia group is the loser. Mungiki recruited massively during the events and thousands
of members demonstrated within Nairobi City Centre to demand the release of one of its
key leaders. This is a clear indication that the group can make itself either visible or
invisible.34
25 There is a high risk that several of these militia groups could heavily arm themselves.
Thus, while the Group of 41 may still be using machetes and arrows, the Mungiki have
firearms.  The  criminalization  of  protests,  with  “rioters”  infiltrating  the  protesters,
together with the militarization of society, is expanding to fill in the vacuum left by the
State. Those who suffer the most are the most disadvantaged fringes of the population,
from  the  urban  proletariat  to  the  rural  dispossessed.  It  is  among  these  that  the
“recruitment  sergeants”  of  the  militia  (jeshi,  “armies”  in  Kiswahili)  work,  finding
consenting prey among the excluded youth (from land resources, education system). This
is  because  even  though  the  free  education  programmes  implemented  by  the  Kibaki
government  has  given  of  thousands  of  youth  access  to  education,  poverty  has  not
reduced. One of the crucial issues remains employment of qualified youth, professional
relegation, or those that are both unemployed and uneducated.
 
Uncertainties: superficial pacification?
26 Negotiations  to  resolve  the  crisis  began  early  and  could  have  been  concluded  by
10 January but the signing of the memorandum of understanding entitled “Principles of
Agreement”  by  Kibaki  and  Raila  in  the  presence  of  John Kufuor,  the  African  Union
mediator,  Adam Wood,  the  British  High  Commissioner,  together  with  American  and
French ambassadors (M. Ranneberger and E. Barbier), did not take place: Kibaki’s PNU
hardliners pressured him to abscond at the eleventh hour.35 The debates also became
more serious and there was no end to the crisis as chaos spread across the country. Kofi
Annan’s  arrival  in  Kenya  on  22 January  and  the  beginning  of  fresh  negotiations  on
28 January  led  to  some  progress.  Each  camp  appointed  a  small  committee  bringing
together hardliners and moderates.36 On 23 February, the creation of the post of Prime
Minister for leader of the majority party in parliament and allocation of about 10 cabinet
posts to ODM was adopted and after several days of pussy-footing, an accord was signed
on 28 February.
27 Until then, Kibaki and his supporters, who had time on their side, increasingly engaged in
diversion tactics, sending out signals of an enhanced authoritarianism. The appointment
of a partial government on 8 January, the same day that John Kufuor arrived, was the first
indication of this trend. It was confirmed by the inclusion of controversial figures like
George Saitoti, John Michuki and Martha Karua. The appointment of Musyoka—who was
third in the presidential race—to the post of Vice-President clearly demonstrated Kibaki’s
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desire to seal up government positions, leaving only measly ministerial positions for any
possible ODM appointees.
28 Under such conditions, international mediation was difficult. Kibaki, however, pointed
out that the mediation was offensive or at the very least, useless since in his opinion, the
situation  had  been  contained  and  no  illegality  had  been  noted.  The  impression  of
indecision  and  tension  which  characterized  the  crisis  resolution  process  was
strengthened by mixed signals from some partners, especially Americans,37 disorder and
repeated  postponement  in  the  arrival  dates  of  mediators  and  intermediaries,38
government attitude,39 and even the assassination of ODM parliamentarians.40 The power
relations were also complex: each camp had hardliners and it was unclear how far they
were prepared to go and who were in conflict not only with their direct adversaries but
also sometimes with their own more moderate allies.41 Away from the political circles,
there  was  concern  within  the  business  community,  which  urged  political  leaders  to
speedily resolve the crisis. They even took part in the initial negotiations. The Kibaki
government’s economic objectives for 2007 had been extremely ambitious: 10% growth in
the short-term and attaining the status of middle-income countries by 2030. However, the
events  of  early  2008  undermined  the  economy  and  cast  doubt  on  speedy  recovery,
especially because several donors would be obliged to reconsider their assistance.42
29 Despite the duration of the crisis, there were some encouraging signs. The parliamentary
elections culminated in a convincing victory by ODM, with some unknown candidates
flooring old regulars in government. Many ministers lost their seats and almost all of
Kibaki’s generals were kicked out of government through the ballot. During parliament’s
opening session on 15 January, ODM candidate, Kenneth Marende, was elected with 105
votes in the third round of voting (against 101 for the PNU candidate), amidst fears that
ODM parliamentarians would be approached (meaning bribed or manipulated) by PNU
emissaries to join them and ruin opposition parliamentary hopes. Finally, the civil society
was very active in public debate and adopted positions that were both uncompromising
(demanding Kibaki’s resignation)43 and moderate (expressing desire to see the course of
justice replace street protests).44 This was an expression of the civil society’s competitive
function as an interested party.45 Nevertheless, even though they were well established
and organized, they still seemed incapable of weakening the government—in this regard,
the situation has barely changed over the past ten years.46
30 Kenya was in the eye of the storm.47 Although normal life in Nairobi had resumed and the
agreement  signed  on  28 February  2008  raised  hopes  of  political  appeasement,  the
situation  remained  unstable.  With  the  immediate  problems  affecting  the  internally
displaced people,  continued clashes across  the country,  the difficulty in defining the
necessary  constitutional  amendments  for  power-sharing,  the  challenge  of  peace  was
colossal.
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NOTES
1. The Kikuyu make up about 22% of the population, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%
and  Kamba  11%.  Kenya  has  more  than  40  ethnic  communities,  some  of  which  are
integrated in large communities. For example, the Kalenjin community was formed in the
1940s  to  bring  together  several  ethnic  communities  (Kipsigis,  Nandi,  Tugen,  Keiyo,
Marakwet in particular) and came up a common standard dialect, initially referred to as
Nandi.
2. According to the ECK,  Kibaki  (Party of  National  Unity—PNU) won the presidential
election with 4,584,721 votes (46%), against 4,352,903 (44%) garnered by Odinga (Orange
Democratic  Movement,  ODM) and 879,903  (9%)  garnered by Kalonzo Musyoka (ODM-
Kenya, ODM-K). Voter turnout was estimated at 69%. During the same elections, Kenyans
elected their parliamentarians: ODM (99 seats) won by a landslide ahead of PNU (43 seats),
ODM-K (16 seats) and Kenya African National Union (KANU), former single party, which
saw its decline sealed (14 seats).
3. For the electoral map, refer to paper by Bernard Calas in this volume.
4. In reality, the initial riots, which had taken place on 29 December (in Kisumu, Kericho
and in Nairobi’s Kibera slums) involved youth who were exasperated by the ECK’s
postponements.
5. In February 2008, estimates put the number of internally displaced persons between
200,000 and 250,000. It was not easy to count them because, strictly speaking, there was
no IDP camp. The refugees were as varied as they were mobile as the IDPs moved around
a lot.
6. Apart  from getting a major part  of  its  resources from tourism,  whose season had
already been ruined, Kenya is a regional supply hub (oil,  food).  Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi  therefore  experienced shortages.  For  initial  figures,  refer  to  R.  Porhel,  ‘The
economic consequences of the political crisis,’ in this volume.
7. The methods mentioned were vote-buying during campaigns, intimidation during the
election period, higher number of voters than those registered, voting by dead voters,
theft and smuggling of ballot boxes (the official seal was sometimes replaced by adhesive
tape...),  changing  of  ballot  papers,  missing  signatures  of  poll  agents,  sending  of
photocopies instead of originals of result documents, and finally the rewriting of results
during final vote tallying.
8. The European Union Elections Observation Mission,  ‘Preliminary statement:  doubts
about the credibility of the presidential results hamper Kenya’s democratic progress.’ 1
January 2008; Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Kenya general election 27 December 2007: the
report of the Commonwealth Observer Group.’ January 2008; Kenya Elections Domestic
Observation  Forum,  ‘Preliminary  statement  and  verdict  of  the  2007  Kenya’s  general
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elections.’ 31 December 2007; East African Community Observer Mission, ‘Report on the
Kenya general elections, December 2007.’ January 2008.
9. The mobile  phone was a  key tool  in the rumour propaganda (via  SMS).  Both the
opposition and the government used it unsparingly weeks before, during and after the
elections.
10. Early in January 2008, an arson attack on an Eldoret church in which scores of people
perished  was  one  of  the  most  widely  covered  incidents  by  the  media.  Journalists
published survivors’ testimonies which talked of mutilation, escapes through the window.
However, many acts of extreme violence, of which there was clear evidence, were not
covered by the media, especially those that took place in Nairobi slums. The first detailed
reports  became public  in February.  See:  Kenya Human Rights  Institute,  ‘Civil  Society
Responses  to  the  Kenyan  Crisis.’  Nairobi,  February  2008.  This  report  distinguishes
spontaneous  violence,  militia  activity,  gender  violence,  reprisals  and  opportunistic
violence;  the report also revisits  the threats issued by some groups,  for example the
Thagicu People’s Redemption Movement, whose two main targets were ‘traitors’ of the
Kikuyu  community  and  human  rights  activists.  Together  with  these  were  the
‘anonymous’ threats warning members of some ethnic communities to leave their homes.
During election campaigns and the weeks that followed them, vernacular radios (Kass FM
in Kalenjin, Inooro, Kameme and Coro in Kikuyu) broadcast programmes that encouraged
ethnic chauvinism.
11. Mungiki, a Kikuyu militia formed in 1987, is today the most structured group in the
country. It is said to have 600,000 members, who, however, pursue different aims. Many
Mungiki  adherents,  who  are  also  “available,”  engage  in  politically  commissioned
operations and in various business ventures (controlling official or underworld markets).
They go through a Kikuyu initiation ritual which gives their membership a religious basis.
Refer to references cited by Anne Cussac.
12. There was also a possibility of police behaviour being ethnically-oriented: there were
testimonies  of  Kikuyu  police  officers  passively  watching  as  members  of  the  Luo
community were assaulted (and vice versa)
13. This mainly applied to the slums. Refer to M.-A. Goux, ‘Guerre des loyers dans les
bidonvilles de Nairobi.’ Politique Africaine, No 91, October 2003, pp. 68–82.
14. For more on these regional conflicts, refer to the papers by Claire Médard and Anne
Cussac.
15. Refer to maps by drawn Bernard Calas (subsequent pages) to illustrate this.
16. See, for example, ‘Four killed in clash,’ The Standard, 26 February 2008.
17. For more about this period, refer to ‘Le Kenya. Le contrat social à l’abandon’ No 70
June 1998 and ‘Le Kenya après Moi’ No 90 June 2003, both published in Politique Africaine.
18. Majimbo originally stands for a federal system that enabled each region to have its
own government. After being experimented at independence, it was abandoned but the
idea gained currency during crises, like in the 1990s and the 2007 election campaigns
during which candidate Odinga said it would be implemented if he was elected.
19. J. Lonsdale,  ‘Kenya: ethnicity,  tribe  and  state.’  17  January  2008,  available  on
openDemocracy.  URL:  https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/
kenya_ethnicity_tribe_and_state/ [archive].
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20. Debates in Kenya and in Great Britain on the scale of the Mau Mau movement are far
from over.  Refer to,  among others,  the detailed biography in M.-E.  Pommerolle,  ‘Une
mémoire  vive:  debats  historiques  et  judiciaires  sur  la  violence  coloniale  au  Kenya.’
Politique Africaine, June 2006, No 102, pp. 85–100.
21. Refer to J. Lonsdale, ‘Ethnicité morale et tribalisme politique.’ Politique Africaine, No 61,
March 1996, pp. 98–115, and ‘Moral and Political Argument in Kenya.’ In Berman, D. Eyoh
and W. Kymlicka (eds), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, Oxford, James Currey, Athens,
Ohio University Press, 2004, pp. 73–95.
22. J. Lonsdale, ‘Le cas kényan: un débat moral et politique.’ Politique Africaine, No 90, June
2003, p. 19.
23. From the mid-1970s, several reports have shed light on the use of State resources to
favour the  Central  Province  (Kikuyu).  Parliamentarians  demanded  better  land
distribution and change in economic policy but they were repressed or even assassinated.
Upon  Kenyatta’s  death  in  1978,  his  vice-president,  Daniel  arap  Moi  managed  to
manipulate the divisions among the Kikuyu elite to overcome the opposition to his take-
over, which was actually provided for in the constitution. Kibaki, who was then minister
of finance, supported him. Cf. J. Widner, From “Harambee” to “Nyayo!” The Rise of a Party
State in Kenya. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992.
24. Concerning this process and its consequences, refer to J. Klopp, ‘Can moral ethnicity
trump political liberalism? The struggle for land and nation in Kenya.’ African Studies, vol.
61, No. 2, 2002, pp. 269–294; C. Médard, ‘Les conflits ‘ethniques’ au Kenya: une question de
votes ou de terres?’ Afrique contemporaine, no. 180.
25. F.  Grignon,  ‘La  démocratisation au risque du débat?  Territoires  de  la  critique et
imaginaires politiques au Kenya (1990–1995).’ In D.-C. Martin (ed), Nouveau langages du
politique en Afrique orientale, Paris, Karthala, Nairobi, IFRA, 1998, p. 32.
26. P. Ndung’u, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public
Land,  Nairobi,  Government  Printer,  December  2004.  Also  refer  to  R.  Southall,  ‘The
Ndung’u Report. Land and graft in Kenya.’ Review of African Political Economy, vol. 32, No
103, 2005, pp. 142–151. The Commission, whose members were specialists drawn from
relevant ministries, was appointed by Kibaki in June 2003.
27. There are three types of land: government land (former crown lands), land under
community  jurisdiction  (trust  lands,  belonging  to  various  ethnic  communities,  but
managed by the provincial administration) and private land.
28. P. Ndung’u, Report of the Commission... op. cit.; P.M. Syagga, ‘Land ownership and uses
in  Kenya:  policy  prescriptions  from  an  inequality  perspective.’  In  Society  for
International  Development (SID),  Readings  on Inequality  in  Kenya.  Sectoral  Dynamics  and
Perspectives, Nairobi, SID East Africa, 2006, pp. 289–344.
29. For  further  readings  on  constitutional  reform  and  the  referendum  against  the
government, refer to H. Charton and C. Médard (ed), Annuaire de l’Afrique orientale 2005,
Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007, p. 59–128.
30. Irin, ‘Kenya: armed and dangerous.’ 22 February 2008. The last group, in particular, is
said to be well organized, no doubt by former soldiers. Other militias can be mentioned
like Mulungunipa Forest Group (South Coast, towards Kwale), Kosovo Boys (Luhya and
Luo militia based in Kibera) and even the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), which is
mentioned later in this volume by Claire Médard.
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31. H. Maupeu, ‘Vie et mort d’un groupe de pression électorale. L’exemple de Youth for
KANU ‘92.’’ L’Afrique orientale 2000, Paris, L’Harmattan, Pau, Crepao, Nairobi, IFRA, 2000,
pp. 395–421.
32. There are still few comparative studies on these militias. D. Anderson, ‘Vigilantes,
violence and the politics of public order in Kenya.’ African Affairs, No 101, 2002, pp. 531–
555.
33. Cited by International Crisis Group (ICG), Kenya in Crisis,  Africa Report No 137, 21
February 2008, p. 14.
34. ‘Mungiki demo takes city by surprise.’ Daily Nation, 6 March 2008.
35. ICG, Kenya in Crisis, op. cit., pp. 21–22.
36. Ministers Karua and Ongeri and MP Kilonzo to represent the government and MPs
Mudavadi, Ruto, Kosgei and Orengo to represent ODM.
37. The United States had indicated the day after the announcement of results that the
elections had been free and fair. Two days later, they reviewed their position and Jendayi
Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, came to Nairobi as mediator. From
then on, US intervention was either firm or moderate,  and Condoleeza Rice’s visit to
Kenya on 17 February was a demonstration of the will to pacify the debates. It is also
worth noting that at the same time (16–23 February), George W. Bush was in Tanzania to
discuss the setting up of Africom, a US military base along the eastern coast of Africa.
38. Disorder  because  several  former  African  presidents  (Benjamin  Mkapa,  Ketumile
Masire, Joaquim Chisssano), as well as Graca Machel,  wife of Nelson Mandela, arrived
“uninvited.”  Only  Machel  and  Mkapa  were  involved  in  the  negotiations;  Ugandan
President Museveni, who had invited himself at a time when rumours were rife about the
presence of his army in western Kenya, was welcomed more warmly by Kibaki (military
support  to  him  was  an  option  for  Uganda,  which  would  suffer  if  Kenya  collapsed).
Postponements were due to delays in the arrival of John Kufuor and Kofi Annan.
39. When Odinga,  on 18 January,  called for  a  stop to demonstrations and change of
strategy (boycott of pro-government companies), the government announced it had set
up a mediation committee whose members were Kibaki’s close allies or very ‘strategic’
(head  of  delegation:  Musyoka;  members:  Saitoti,  Karua,  Uhuru  Kenyatta,  Attorney-
General Amos Wako.). This committee never sat.
40. Mellitus Mugabe Were, MP for Embakasi (Nairobi) was shot dead on the night of 28
January;  David  Kimutai  Too,  MP for  Ainamoi  (near  Eldoret),  was  gunned down by  a
policeman two days later.
41. People like Joseph Kamotho, Karua, Amos Kimunya, Michuki and Njenga Karume of
PNU and Balala and Ruto of ODM stopped at nothing in their extremist game. In the ICG
report cited above, two Kikuyus—Joe Wanjui and Nathaniel Kang’ethe—who controlled
access to Kibaki, were also mentioned.
42. In 2007, the Kenya government together with 17 principal donors and civil society
representatives  adopted  an  economic  assistance  strategy,  the  Kenya  Joint  Assistance
Strategy (KJAS), which set out three levels of funding (high, medium and low) depending
on governance. The low level of funding would lead to a reduction of budgetary and
sectoral assistance.
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43. A petition signed at  the beginning of  2008 by about 30 NGOs (including the Law
Society of Kenya and the Institute of Education for Democracy), which was perhaps too
fiery, was not covered by the media.
44. P.  Kagwanja,  ‘Breaking Kenya’s  impasse.  Chaos  or  courts?’  African  Policy  Institute,
Working paper, January 2008.
45. Refer  to  Kenya  Human  Rights  Institute,  Civil  Society  Responses.,  op. cit.,  which
mentions activities  of  various civil  society organizations (Amani  Mashinani  Initiative,
Amani Focus, Africog) aimed at finding a solution to the crisis.
46. H. Maupeu and J. Lafargue, ‘La société civile kényane: entre résilience et résistance.’
Politique Africaine, No. 70, June 1998, pp. 61–73; D. Connan, ‘La ‘société civile’des droits de
l’homme et les élections kényanes de 2007: quête de légitimation politique et impuissance
sociale.’ Les Cahiers de l’Afrique de l’Est (Nairobi), No. 37, 2008.
47. On 25  January 2008,  the  day after  the  Kibaki-Raila  handshake witnessed by Kofi
Annan, clashes continued in Kibera and Mathare. During the whole of February, violence
was the order of the day in some slum areas while the western parts of the country lived
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